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Introduction
In 1908, in Introduction to the Science of Law and Morality Leon Petrażycki 
noted: 
The fact that till today no one has succeeded in defi ning law, even though a lot of effort 
was put into it and there had been developed innumerable, more or less fundamental 
and interesting attempts at describing the essence of law, has even led to doubts as to 
whether the question may be answered at all, or to the acceptance of defi nitions which 
are clearly unacceptable.1
Since 1908, such convictions have been repeated on many occasions.2 For some 
(Petrażycki included) the reason for this is that jurisprudence has never been 
a proper science. They claim that the only way to give a satisfactory explanation 
of law is to develop a naturalistic conception thereof. In recent years, due to the 
astonishing advancements in biology (especially, neuroscience), the project of 
naturalizing law has become again a subject of heated debate.
The problem is very complex and thus, in this short essay, I will confi ne my-
self to some preliminary remarks. I will devote considerable attention to two 
cases studies: Petrażycki’s own reductionist project and a recent proposal by 
Wojciech Załuski. I will try to evaluate them from two perspectives. First, I will 
look at how they answer the ontological question (‘what is law’), and second, 
I will consider their answers to the normativity question (‘how do legal norms be-
come reasons for action’). The choice of those questions is quite straightforward. 
The ontological problem is one with which jurisprudence has struggled from its 
beginnings. The normativity question, in turn, points toward the most intrigu-
ing aspects of law: its normative force. I take the liberty of adopting a working 
defi nition of normativity (a rule of behavior is normative if it constitutes a reason 
for action). This is a commonly accepted defi nition, and – anyway – it suffi ces for 
my purposes.
1  L. Petrażycki, Wstęp do nauki o prawie i moralności (Introduction to the Science of Law 
and Morality), PWN, Warszawa 1959, p. 25.
2  E.g. H. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961, in the Introduction.
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Case study: Petrażycki’s legal theory
Petrażycki is considered one of the most eminent – if not the most eminent 
– Polish legal theorist. His answer to the question ‘what is law?’ is very original 
indeed. It does not mean, however, that his conception is fl awless. Petrażycki set 
out to lay new foundations for jurisprudence and claimed that this task requires, 
fi rst and foremost, an answer to the question, what is law. He observed that 
without such a defi nition any legal-philosophical and legal-theoretic consider-
ations are carried out in a vacuum:
This is a principal and prejudicial issue, one which conditions the very possibility of 
the science of law.3
The answer to the question ‘what is law’ demands, according to Petrażycki, to ap-
ply an adequate method. The problem is, however, that the methodological tools 
Petrażycki uses are out-dated if not anachronistic – even from the perspective of 
the 19th-century philosophy of science.4 Petrażycki claims that the goal of juris-
prudence – understood as ‘a science in the correct sense of the word’5 – is to look 
for the essence of law.6 In effect one should try to construct a classical defi nition 
of law, i.e. a defi nition per genus et differentiam: 
In order to divide the law scientifi cally into kinds and determine the differences be-
tween them, one should know the genus of law (...). It is thus necessary to recognize to 
which higher, more general category of phenomena law belongs.7
Here, in a nutshell, one can fi nd all the ingredients of the Aristotelian view of sci-
ence. It assumes, fi rst, that in the world there exist essences; the aim of science 
is, thus, to capture those essences in defi nitions which serve to build a table of 
essential defi nitions (Porphyry’s tree), one that classifi es all entities univocally. 
Petrażycki’s method presupposes, then, a very strong metaphysical view. It also 
encapsulates a static conception of science. Both those features are inconsistent 
with the practice of contemporary science. 
Furthermore, one has to note that some of Petrażycki’s claims open the door 
to a revision of the Aristotelian orthodoxy. He says, e.g.: 
The foundation of scientifi c legal policy should be the examination of the causal fea-
tures and the causal mechanisms of law in general, and of its different kinds and ele-
ments in particular.8
The quoted passage indicates that jurisprudence should confi ne itself to the con-
siderations of causal connections, while in the Aristotelian tradition the teleo-
logical connections play an eminent role. Moreover, Petrażycki notes also: 
3  L. Petrażycki, Wstęp..., p. 41. 
4  Cf. the views of French conventionalists. 
5  L. Petrażycki, Wstęp..., p. 13.
6  Ibidem, p. 39.
7  Ibidem, pp. 31, 35.
8  Ibidem, p. 14.
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Especially in science, where each and every theory needs to overcome attempts at re-
jection and modifi cation in order to be considered acceptable (...), where one has to do 
with a ‘struggle for life’ and only the fi ttest doctrines survive, one should expect that 
with the passage of time there should survive objectively sound theories.9 
Such a declaration fi ts well with the conceptions of Popper or Lakatos. This is 
evidence that Petrażycki had many original insights connected to the question of 
what is science. Unfortunately, he combined them with the anachronistic ideas 
of Aristotle. This led, in turn, to the development of an incoherent methodology. 
It wouldn’t be devastating if the elements of the essentialist ideology remained 
at the verbal level only but Petrażycki applied those methodological rules me-
ticulously, what makes his theory of law, one conceived in original sin, an unac-
ceptable one. 
For Petrażycki – and that is also Aristotelian – jurisprudence, as well as other 
humanistic and social disciplines, needs a foundation, which is to be found in 
a more basic science: psychology. Petrażycki was unhappy with the psychology of 
his time, in particular, disagreeing with the Kantian heritage it accepted. Kant 
divided mental phenomena into three categories: knowing, feeling and willing. 
Petrażycki considered this division incomplete, claiming that one should add to 
it another, fourth category: 
One should distinguish not three, but four basic forms of inner experiences and four 
classes of mental elements: (1) emotions, i.e. impulsions (two-sided mental experienc-
es), (2) and (3) sensations and feelings (passive one-sided experiences), (4) processes of 
the will (one-sided active experiences).10
Emotions (impulsions), a category which is essential for the task of defi ning 
law, are two-sided, active-passive, while all the other experiences are one-sided. 
Among the emotions Petrażycki includes hunger and love.11
Further, Petrażycki provides us with a classifi cation of emotions. From our 
perspective, the most interesting are the ethical emotions (emotions of duty), 
which “are experienced as an inner limitation of freedom.”12 Ethical emotions 
could be further divided into moral and legal; the former are exclusively impera-
tive (i.e., the actor feels obliged to do something), while the latter are imperative-
attributive (the actor feels obliged to do something, but accepts also that some-
one else has the right to require her to do it). This distinction leads Petrażycki to 
the famous defi nition:
Law, as a separate class of real phenomena should be understood as such mental 
experiences whose emotions are of the attributive character (...). All the other ethical 
experiences, i.e. experiences of exclusively imperative emotions, should be deemed 
moral phenomena.13 
9  Ibidem, pp. 205–206.
10  L. Petrażycki, O pobudkach postępowania i o istocie moralności i prawa (On the Motives 
for Action and on the Essence of Morality and Law), Ofi cyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2002, p. 14.
11  Cf. ibidem, p. 10.
12  Ibidem, p. 27.
13  L. Petrażycki, Teoria państwa i prawa (Theory of State and Law), PWN, Warszawa 1960, 
vol. I, pp. 72, 73, 123.
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One should be mistaken, however, if she insisted that Petrażycki identifi es legal 
norms with certain emotions or complex mental experiences. In order to clarify 
this issue, one should distinguish between such notions as emotion, representa-
tion, norm and duty. 
Emotion, as noted above, is one of the four basic, irreducible mental experi-
ences. People, according to Petrażycki, have also the power to imagine certain 
situations or behaviour. Such an imagined representation – together with the 
emotion it causes – constitutes a motive for action. In On the Motives for Action 
and on the Essence of Morality and Law Petrażycki says: 
We are interested, especially, in one particular type of motivation, the one in which 
there is a connection of representations of various acts with very peculiar emotions, 
which we deem ethical emotions or emotions of duty.14 
For instance: if I imagined taking part in a fraud, “I would experience a mental 
state similar to that which I experience while considering eating a piece of rotten 
meat, touching a spider or a snake; in normal circumstances I would experience 
repulsive emotions.”15
Furthermore, one should distinguish between emotions, representations and 
motives on the one hand, and legal and moral norms and duties on the other. 
Petrażycki defi nes legal (moral) norms as the contents of the ethical (moral or 
legal) convictions.16 Thus, norms are not emotions, motives etc but they are of 
an intellectual character. They may be described as specifi c representations or 
propositions, which can be grasped (contemplated). It is worth noting that those 
representations (propositions) serve as primitive terms in Petrażycki’s psychol-
ogy, similar to the notion of idea in Hobbes, Descartes or Locke, or the notion of 
concept in Kant. 
The notion of duty is defi ned in a similar way. Petrażycki says:
Duties are ideal projections, which originate in our minds. Such projections are con-
nected to the described emotions and representations, and not to some things or phe-
nomena in the outer world.17
It seems, therefore, that duties should also be called representations or proposi-
tions, which are graspable by the human mind. One can fi nd the confi rmation of 
those conceptual distinctions in the following passages:
The explained difference of genus between one-sided imperative (moral) and two-sided 
duty-imposing (legal) norms and duties is based on the adequate genus differences 
among the emotional-intellectual complex phenomena which are, as we demonstrat-
ed, the real base for ethical duties and norms.18 
14  L. Petrażycki, O pobudkach..., p. 25.
15  Ibidem, p. 21.
16  Ibidem, p. 33.
17  Ibidem, p. 34.
18  Ibidem, p. 49.
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The basic motivation, which consists in connecting representations of actions with the 
above characterized repulsive or apulsive emotions, we should deem ethical motiva-
tion and the corresponding principles of behaviour – ethical principles or norms.19
Therefore, law and morality exist in the minds of people. Law cannot be identi-
fi ed with norms. It would be a mistake, however, to identify it with certain ethi-
cal emotions. When Petrażycki says that “law, as a separate class of real phe-
nomena should be understood as such mental experiences whose emotions are of 
the attributive character,” he claims that law is a complex mental phenomenon, 
one that consists of the adequate emotions, norms and duties. 
Still, one more problem should be addressed: what is the relationship between 
the law (in Petrażycki’s sense) and the provisions of legal acts. Petrażycki’s reply 
is the following:
The representations of legal provisions or biblical commandments shall be deemed the 
representations of “normative facts.” Ethical convictions, to which such representa-
tions belong, shall be called positive ethical convictions, and their contents – positive 
norms. Ethical convictions, which lack such representations of normative facts, are 
intuitive ethical convictions, and the corresponding norms – intuitive norms.20
The general mental mechanism proposed by Petrażycki looks as follows: people 
have the capacity to imagine certain situations, patterns of behaviour etc. There 
are a plethora of sources of such imagined representations: legal acts, Bible, or 
any other “normative fact,” as well as one’s own intuition. Those representations 
cause the corresponding legal or moral emotions. Together, they serve as mo-
tives for action. 
In light of the above, one may say that Petrażycki presents us with a peculiar 
ontology of law. He believes that norms are certain representations or proposi-
tions. He claims, moreover, that law cannot be identifi ed with the set of legal 
norms. Law consists of complex mental states, which include representations 
(propositions), and emotions, generating together motives for action. 
It is interesting that Petrażycki does not address the problem of law’s norma-
tivity. He does not consider legal (or moral) norms as objective reasons for ac-
tion. He seems to concentrate on a different question: how does a legal or moral 
norm motivate people’s actions. The key role in this process is played by the 
relationship between representations of certain states of affairs and the ethical 
emotions they generate. Does this mean that the reductionist strategy deployed 
by Petrażycki leads to the elimination of the concept of law’s normativity? Does 
Petrażycki show that the notions of a legal norm which is an objective reason for 
action is meaningless? The answer is a plain ‘no.’ The notion of normativity is 
needed as soon as Petrażycki moves from describing law to the problems of legal 
policy. 
The entire theoretical enterprise described above, which aims at uncovering 
the psychological mechanisms of how legal and moral norms infl uence human 
behaviour, has an additional, practical goal. Petrażycki says: 
19  Ibidem, p. 28.
20  Ibidem, p. 33.
78 Bartosz Brożek
The essence of the legal policy problems boils down to scientifi cally justifi ed predic-
tion of the effects of enacting legal provisions. Legal policy aims at developing such 
principles, which – introduced into the legal system or in some other way – would yield 
the required effects.21
Moreover, Petrażycki devotes much attention to describe those “required ef-
fects.” The legislator, he claims, has a certain goal to realize.22 The goal is to 
be reached in a purely instrumental way, with the utilization of the knowledge 
concerning the mental motivational mechanisms. In such a setting the legisla-
tor becomes a “super-human.” While “ordinary” people are led by emotions, the 
legislator applies the rules of pure instrumental rationality. It is necessary, of 
course, to explain the normativity of those rules. Furthermore, the surprising 
fact that a certain kind of rules – the rules of rationality – are of totally different 
character than legal and moral rules is also in need of explanation. Thus, the 
reduction proposed by Petrażycki is only partial and it suffers from a serious 
‘schizophrenia.’ 
In conclusion: Petrażycki offers an intriguing conception of law. Contrary to 
usual presentations, he does not identify legal norms with emotions. He claims 
that law is a complex mental phenomenon. Unfortunately, along the way he 
commits some grave errors. The anachronistic method he applies – Aristotle’s 
essentialism – carries with itself a serious metaphysical baggage. Accepting it, 
Petrażycki is forced to look for the essence of law, an ephemerid nowhere to be 
found. Moreover, misled by Aristotelianism, Petrażycki looks for a foundational 
answer to the question ‘what is law.’ This foundationalism has two faces: fi rst, it 
requires us to look for a science that is more basic than jurisprudence; second, it 
launches a search for some basic phenomena, which taken together ‘produce’ law. 
All those defi ciencies would be avoidable if Petrażycki recognized the role phi-
losophy should play in any attempt at defi ning law. Instead, he tried to construct 
the defi nition of law directly at the level of the “more fundamental” science of 
psychology (I disregard the fact that Petrażycki’s psychology has little to do with 
the contemporary psychology, as my remarks are methodological in character). 
The disregard for the philosophical dimension of his project leads Petrażycki to 
a premature dismissal of the phenomenon of normativity. It turns out that the 
normativity problem – reduced to the psychological problem of the motivating 
force of law – reappears at a different level. When considering the goals of legal 
policy, Petrażycki explicitly states that a legislator should act according to rules 
of instrumental rationality, ones that clearly possess some normative force.
 Case study: Załuski on the evolutionary philosophy of law
Wojciech Załuski in his Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy23 sets out 
to illuminate several problems of legal philosophy from the point of view of evo-
21  L. Petrażycki, Wstęp..., pp. 13–14.
22  Cf. K. Motyka, Leon Petrażycki’s Challenge to Legal Orthodoxy, Towarzystwo Naukowe 
KUL, Lublin 2007, pp. 48–49.
23  Cf. W. Załuski, Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
2009.
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lutionary theory, or – more precisely – evolutionary psychology. He attempts to 
answer several questions, among which are the ontological question and the nor-
mativity question. Załuski applies a cautious strategy, one that safeguards him 
from such methodological mistakes as violating the ‘Is – Ought’ distinction. He 
begins by reconstructing the evolutionary view of human nature. This concept, 
in turn, is compared with the anthropological theses presupposed by different 
conceptions of law. If the presupposed view of the human nature is incompatible 
with the evolutionary view, a given legal-theoretic conception may be deemed 
incompatible with the fi ndings of evolutionary theory.
Załuski identifi es two aspects of ‘human nature:’ the dominant motive for 
action and the dominant mode of action.24 He claims that evolutionary theory 
implies a view according to which humans are narrowly altruistic and imper-
fectly rational. It must be noted, that the evolutionary view of human nature is 
of statistical character: it consists of the theses that most people are narrowly 
altruistic and imperfectly rational. Moreover, it is best to consider this concept 
a technical device: it serves as a short term standing for a longer description that, 
in addition to the two theses (concerning human narrow altruism and imperfect 
rationality), includes some assumptions of the evolutionary psychology. 
Replying to the ontological question, Załuski begins by analyzing several con-
ceptions of the origins of law.25 According to the Hobbesian model, people are 
generally egoistic, the state of nature is a state of chaos and law is established by 
the way of social contract. The Hayekian model, on the other hand, assumes that 
the state of nature is orderly, people have collectivist preferences and the mod-
ern law aims at minimizing those collectivist attitudes which stand in the way of 
the development of bigger societies. Finally, the Darwinian model assumes that 
people are narrowly altruistic, that the state of nature is a state of order, which – 
by strengthening of the cooperative dispositions people have – developed into the 
modern society. Within such a setting both the Hobbesian and Hayekian concep-
tions prove to be incompatible with the fi ndings of the evolutionary psychology.
More important – but quite insuffi cient – is Załuski’s answer to the question 
what is law. Załuski begins by recalling Herbert Hart’s distinction between the 
external and the internal points of view and claims that what he calls the primi-
tive law boils down to the regularities in the cooperative behaviour of the mem-
bers of a society coupled with the acceptance of those regularities as patterns of 
obligatory behaviour. Załuski claims further, that such regularities and their 
acceptance can be explained in an evolutionary perspective. The fact that human 
beings are narrowly altruistic and imperfectly rational constitutes a base for hu-
man cooperative dispositions. These in turn, explain why human behaviour is 
regular and why those regularities are taken by people as patterns of obligatory 
behaviour. 
Załuski develops his theory by utilizing the concepts of emergence and super-
venience. He claims that legal norms are emergent entities which supervene on 
the regularities of social behaviour and the acceptance of those regularities as 
the patterns of obligatory behaviour. He observes that this thesis is not formu-
24  Cf. ibidem, chapter I.
25  Cf. ibidem, chapter II.
80 Bartosz Brożek
lated on the basis of the evolutionary theory. He justifi es it by pointing out that 
(1) law does not boil down to sole regularities of behaviour; (2) nor it is the sole 
acceptance of certain patterns of behavior as obligatory; (3) nor it is a simple sum 
of the two. As an emergent entity, legal norms: (1) are based on some lower-level 
entities (regular social behaviour, specifi c mental states) but are not reducible 
to them; (2) display downward-causation (law can infl uence the lower-level enti-
ties); and (3) are ontologically different from the lower-level entities. 
The ontological conception proposed by Załuski is undoubtedly very interest-
ing – especially when compared to Petrażycki’s. First, it explains the emergence 
of law on the basis of the evolutionary theory, the best theory we have concern-
ing the origin of man and human society. Second, the ontological view favoured 
by Załuski, one according to which law is an emergent entity supervening on the 
regularities of social behaviour and some mental states – is consistent with the 
conclusions of the evolutionary theory. Third, Załuski stresses that the contem-
porary law is not artifi cial or purely conventional, a phenomenon incompatible 
with ‘human nature.’ 
However, there are several pieces missing in Załuski’s jigsaw. First and fore-
most, he does not explain in a satisfactory way, why law is to be considered 
a supervenient entity. In other words, the ontology he offers appears deus ex 
machina. From this, there follow several troublesome consequences. Załuski’s 
reformulation of Hart’s conception with the use of the concepts of emergence 
and supervenience suggests that Załuski’s conception is concerned only with the 
ontology of legal norms. Such a conception lacks, so to speak, the required on-
tological horizon. Even if we accept that legal norms are emergent entities, we 
would also like to know what are moral norms, the rules of rationality, the rules 
of language etc. 
 Why this is important becomes clearly visible when one considers Załuski’s 
answer to the normativity question.26 Załuski distinguishes between two aspects 
of the normatively question: the motivational aspect and the normative aspect. 
The former is connected to the problem of how legal norms become motives 
for action and the latter with how legal norms can serve as reasons for action. 
Załuski’s treatment of the fi rst problem is very persuasive. He claims that there 
are several evolutionary adaptations that explain the motivational force of legal 
norms. Among them, he mentions the tendency to obey authority, the rudimen-
tary sense of justice and the so-called normative module. 
Unfortunately, Załuski’s answer to the question of how legal norms can serve 
as reasons for action is less satisfactory. He claims – in a surprisingly arbitrary 
way – that the question can be answered only in two ways: the normativity of 
law may have its source in a moral norm, one that obliges us to obey the law; 
or alternatively, legal norms may have normative power because they are at the 
same time moral norms. In such a setting, law’s normativity is always reducible 
to the normativity of moral norms. One may ask why Załuski does not consider 
other options: that law’s normativity is sui generis, or that it is reducible to the 
normativity of the rules of rationality (as in the case of Petrażycki’s conception). 
26  Cf. ibidem, chapter IV.
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In accord with his reducibility thesis, Załuski considers the sources of the 
normativity of moral norms. His answer is, again, unsatisfactory. He says that 
one can analyze this problem once the evolutionary view of human nature is 
reconstructed and contrasted with various philosophical-political conceptions. 
It is hard to understand how it works. Imagine I accept some form of libertar-
ianism or I accept Rawls’ theory. Both conceptions imply some moral norms. 
Now, Załuski claims that such conceptions presuppose a certain conception of 
human nature. He even goes to claim that the libertarian view of human nature 
is incompatible with the evolutionary view, while the Rawlsian anthropological 
theses are consistent with the fi ndings of the evolutionary psychology.27 This is 
a very bold statement. Assume, however, that it is true. So what? Does it explain 
the normativity of moral norms in any way? Surely, it is not the compliance 
with the fi ndings of natural sciences (i.e. the compatibility of the anthropological 
theses) that gives the Rawlsian rules their normative strength. The mystery of 
normativity remains a mystery; it escapes explanation.
While – and for obvious reasons – Załuski’s proposal is superior to that of 
Petrażycki, it is not devoid of troublesome aspects itself. Załuski uses better sci-
ence than Petrażycki does. Moreover, Załuski is methodologically cautious. He 
does not believe the fi ndings of evolutionary theory to be directly relevant for the 
construction of legal ontology. He recognizes the intermediary role of philosophy, 
which leads him to utilize the concept of the evolutionary view of human nature. 
Such methodology carries no serious ontological baggage. Moreover, Załuski’s 
conception is not foundational. He does not search for a more basic science, one 
that jurisprudence can be fi rmly placed on. He does not see law as composed of 
some basic elements (consider his thesis connected to the downward causation). 
However, Załuski’s ontology of legal rules hangs in a vacuum. He does not de-
velop a satisfactory conception of emergent legal rules, he just proclaims it. Still, 
he does not consider legal rules in opposition to other kinds of rules (language 
rules, rationality rules etc.). Finally, he accepts – again, without a solid justifi -
cation – that the normativity of law is reducible to the normativity of morality, 
which, ultimately, escapes explanation.
Concluding remarks: how to naturalize law?
The above presented analyses can serve as a solid basis for developing several 
methodological directives for constructing a naturalized conception of law. 
(Directive 1) Ontological baggage. One should avoid unrecognized ontologi-
cal baggage. The method one uses and the tacit assumptions one accepts may 
introduce serious ontological restrictions, as in the case of Petrażycki. This is 
a serious mistake, as it predetermines the answer one is looking for. It is not 
to say that I believe it possible to construct a conception of law without assum-
ing any ontological theses. However, those ontological commitments should be 
clearly stated and, if necessary, revised or abandoned.
27  Ibidem, p. 136.
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(Directive 2) Antifoundationism. One should avoid looking for the ultimate 
foundation of legal phenomena. The option that law cannot be reduced to some 
simpler entities, but e.g. supervenes on them, while infl uencing them, should at 
least be kept open. 
(Directive 3) Jurisprudence is philosophy. One should not search for a sci-
ence that would be foundational for jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is, ultimately, 
a branch of philosophy. As such, it cannot be reduced to psychology, physics etc. 
It does not mean, however, that it cannot utilize the fi ndings of those sciences. 
However, it is never the case that the fi ndings of natural sciences are directly ap-
plicable in jurisprudence. These are always some interpretations of the scientifi c 
theories – i.e. some philosophical conceptions – that are at play, when one tries 
to assess some legal-philosophical problems from a naturalistic perspective.
(Directive 4) Ontological horizon. One should not confi ne oneself to the 
construction of a conception of law, without considering the ‘surroundings.’ For 
instance, a conception of legal rule which is in no way connected to some concep-
tion of moral norms, rules of rationality etc., is of little value.
Whether these directives can serve to develop a coherent naturalistic concep-
tion of law is an open question and I leave it for another essay.
